Faculty seminar: Andrea Prat Political Power and Market Power
The Department of Economics invites you to a Faculty seminar with Andrea Prat, Columbia University.
- Time
- Place
- E209/E210
- Kalender
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Abstract
We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of firm lobbying shows that concentration and regulation may be either strategic complements or substitutes. Using data for the past 20 years in the US, we study whether merging firms' influence activity increases or decreases after a merger. We document an increase in lobbying activity and we find some evidence for an increase in campaign contributions.
REGISTRATION
If you have any queries regarding the seminar, please contact the seminar organizers Katrine V. Løken, Heidi C. Thysen, Eirik G. Kristiansen or Camilla Nesfossen Hopsdal.