Christian Gollier

Abstract

Because of risk aversion, any sensible investment valuation system should value less projects that contribute more to the aggregate risk, i.e., that have a larger income-elasticity of net benefits. In theory, this is done by adjusting discount rates to consumption betas. But in reality, most public and private institutions and people use a discount rate that is rather insensitive to the risk profile of their investment projects. I show in this paper that the economic consequences of the implied misallocation of capital are dire. To do this, I calibrate a Lucas model in which the investment opportunity set contains a myriad of projects with different expected returns and risk profiles.

The welfare loss of using a single discount rate is equivalent to a permanent reduction in consumption that lies somewhere between 15% and 45%, either at the level of the irrational agents, or at equilibrium if all agents make the same mistake. Economists should devote more energy to support a reform of public discounting systems in favor of what has been advocated by the normative interpretation of modern asset pricing theories over the last four decades.

The seminar is a part of the PhD course BEA527 Long-term asset pricing and sustainability, but everyone are welcome to attend. Refreshments will be served from 12:10.