Title: Paternalism & Discrimination

Abstract: We combine two lab-in-the-field experiments in Bangladesh to study how other-regarding preferences can generate differential treatment. Specifically, we identify how paternalism leads employers to treat two groups differently in order to protect one group, even against its will, from situations they perceive as harmful or unpleasant in the hiring of female workers in Bangladesh. We refer to this as paternalistic discrimination. We observe hiring and application decisions for a night-shift job that provides worker transport at the end of the shift. In the first experiment, we use information about the transport to vary employers’ perceptions of job costs to female workers while holding taste-based and statistical discrimination constant: Not informing employers about the transport decreases demand for female labor by 21%. Employers respond more to transport information than cash payments to female workers that enable workers to purchase transport themselves. In the second experiment, not informing applicants about the transport reduces female labor supply by 13%.