Including the use of bonus pay (case studies or across companies), how to measure performance, balanced scorecard (or alternative ways to use key performance indicators for management control purposes), drivers of profitability in an industry or a company, beyond budgeting, transfer pricing, and organizational boundaries.

Supervisor: Iver Bragelien.

Background:

We know very little about the management practices in Norway. International data have shown that great differences exist between family businesses, multinationals and that the public sector has relatively worse management practices. Questions related to measurement and comparison of management practices invite to a great number of research ideas for a master thesis. You can explore  existing data sets, and create extended data by merging additional firm level information.

Key references:

Corecon. Empirical Project 6: Measuring Management Practices

Data: World Management Survey

Suitable for profiles: ECN, FIN, STR.

Supervisor: Astrid Kunze

Background:

There is a widespread suspicion that top managers and other key person are overpaid. They are frequently lavishly rewarded when the firm is lucky and not penalized when the firm is unlucky. Some receive discretionary severance pay that the firms are not committed to pay. Pay structure and level seem to depend on the owner structure. There are a large set of observations that are puzzling if you believe that owners should provide cost efficient incentives to managers. The project might examine pay structure in a particular industry or across countries and compare observations with empirical predictions from analytical models.

Key references:

Bebchuk, L. A. and J. M. Fried (2004) Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation, Harvard University Press

Data: TBD

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN, FIN

Supervisor: Eirik Gaard Kristiansen

Background:

The best innovators are often not the best producers. Many patented technologies with different owners need to be used together in order to produce a valuable product. Consequently, there should be a vivid market for technology transactions. However, many claim that the market is smaller than expected and not working very well. Knowhow is not easy to sell: None are willing to buy something before they have seen it, and when they have seen it (and can use it) why should they pay for it? Will the patent system solve the problem or can patenting prevent investments in new technologies. You might use Apple (or another firm) as a motivating example for a study of how firms might organize sales and purchases of technologies?

Key references:

Bessen, J. and M.J. Meurer, (2008) Patent failure: How judges, bureaucrats, and lawyers put innovation at risk, Princeton University Press.

Jaffe, A. B. and J. Lerner (2004): Innovation and its Discontents: How our broken patent system is endangering innovation and progress, and what to do about it, Princeton University Press

Data: TBD

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN, FIN, STR

Supervisor: Eirik Gaard Kristiansen

Background:

There are many new data sets documenting the gender composition in the STEM fields that provide a wealth of information for a master thesis. There are also policies implemented that could be discussed and evaluated, if one gets access to the data.

Data: Data can be accessed in cooperation with a research project by Astrid Kunze. Interested students are welcome to get in touch.

Other data sources are accessible for research in Norway (SSB) or Germany (IAB) or Europe.

Suitable for profiles:ECN, FIN, STR.

Supervisor: Astrid Kunze

Background:

Despite the fact that great gender convergence in employment is observed in labour markets, large gender differences remain. Women earn 16 per cent on average less in terms of hourly wages than men in the EU. Women also work in very different occupation and industries than men. True, if we compare men and women in the same job and in the same firm, we find very small wage differences; however, very few men and women work in the same job in the same firm. There are many more differences in labour markets between men and women which invites to important research questions suitable for a masterthesis. You could look for questions related to graduates in economics and business administration (use data from NHH. e.g.). You could study questions at the national level for Norway or another country, or internationally. International evidence is very important to learn and valuable to your career if you work, for example, in a company that does trade with EU and the world. Germany is a country important to learn about, since it is one of the main trading partners of Norway, followed by the UK etc.

Data:

•   SIAB (German register data, employer-employee matched panel, 1975-2015

•   SOEP (Socio Economic Panel for Germany, 1984-2016)

Mikrodata.no at NSD provides access to the Norwegian register data

•    NHH annual graduate survey

Suitable for profiles: ECN, FIN, STR

Supervisor: Astrid Kunze

Background:

How can family-work balance be improved? Why is the female employment rate so high in Scandinavia? In this area of research, we know relatively little on what workplace practices work, which ones families want, how and which ones firms efficiently employ them. Empirical data with new information on work place practices assist to evaluate related questions on employees (labour supply) and employers (labour demand).

Other related questions: wage setting, wage differences, mobility in labour markets

Data:

•    European Work-place practice survey

•    SIAB (German register data, employer-employee matched panel, 1975-2015)

•      SOEP (Socio Economic Panel for Germany, 1984-2016)

•      LIPP (data set for Germany, access has to be arranged 4-6 weeks in advance, a little bit challenging to work with since accessible only on side in Nuernberg, or by remote access, short visit at the data center and short onsite training possible.)

•      Mikrodata.no at NSD provides access to the Norwegian register data

•       Pisa Study contains data on aspirations across countries for some years

Suitable for profiles: ECN, FIN, STR

Supervisor:  Astrid Kunze

Understanding the driving forces behind investment in equipment and machinery has always been important. Firms increase and renew their capital stock through investment, and investment is approx. 20% of GDP. Furthermore, the volatility of investment expenditure is an important contributor to aggregate fluctuations. But what drives the investment, and in particular how are investment decisions affected by uncertainty? This master thesis deals with how to measure uncertainty, and how does the relationship between firm level investment and uncertainty evolve over time. The data are provided by Statistics Norway.

As the data include highly sensitive information, it is necessary to apply for access to the data.

Supervisor: Øivind Anti Nilsen

Background: 

Improved financial market regulation ensure that information is widely spread and investors can trust information and contracts. However, not all parties benefit from better regulation. For example, some established firms dislike that new entrants obtain financing, demand for labour may increase which again will increase wages.  In an influential book, Rajan and Zingales describe how financial regulation across countries can be explained by political forces in favour and against better regulation. A possible project would be to discuss how strong labour unions, industry structure, openness to trade and other institutional characteristics can explain the current regulation in Norway. The project might combine insights from analytical approaches discussed in Tirole with the empirical literature discussed in the book by Rajan and Zingales.

Key references:

Rajan R. G. and L. Zingales (2003), Saving capitalism from the capitalists Princeton University Press.

Tirole, J (2006) The theory of Corporate Finance, see chapter 16 on Institutions, Public Policy and the Political Economy of Finance, Princeton University Press.

Data: TBD

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN, FIN

Supervisor: Eirik Gaard Kristiansen

Background:

In Norway, everybody who is an active member of a sports club is obliged to take a basic sport accident insurance.  This covers amateur and professional sports players who may be injured while playing sport. The policy covers the players during the recognised competition time or during club approved training. Most sporting clubs require players to take out insurance policies, and the cost of the premium for these is covered at the time of player registration. The insurance (partially) covers the cost of diagnosis and treatment in case of accident injury or repetitive strain injury.  In Norway, sports members can voluntarily sign for an extended coverage (“utvidet lisens”) which provides extended coverage.  The thesis would map the market for sport accident insurance and test for adverse selection/moral hazard on this market.

Key references:

Einav L and A Finkelstein (2011) Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics in pictures, Journal of economic Perspectives 25, 115-138; Einav L, A Finkelstein and M Cullen (2010) Estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, 877-921.

Data: Subscription data from various sports organizations and their insurers.

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN

Supervisor: Fred Schroyen

Background:

Several countries, including U.S.A., Canada and Norway, have introduced incentives to encourage the sale of electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles. There is a debate over the effectiveness of these policies in achieving the desired policy goals, such as reductions in CO2 emissions. The Norwegian incentive scheme is notable for high subsidies as well as other extensive benefits, including exemption from the registration tax, free toll roads, free parking, and programs for building charging stations. More detailed knowledge about the effects of specific parts of the incentive scheme would be helpful, both to inform possible improvements of the incentive schemes, but also for planning purposes in businesses and local governments. There are several open questions regarding the effect of the rich incentive scheme. One question regards how much the different policies contribute to increasing electric vehicle sales. A related question is whether they have differential impact on which modes of transportation consumers substitute away from, e.g., whether consumers substitute away from regular cars, public transport and biking, both at the intensive and the extensive margin. A master thesis on this topic could focus on one or several specific policies and subquestions.

Key references:

Fearnley et al (2015): "E-vehicle policies and incentives - assessment and recommendations", TØI report 1421/2015; Chandra et al (2010): "Green drivers or free riders? An analysis of tax rebates for hybrids vehicles", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 60: 78-93; Holtsmark (2012): "Elbilpolitikken - virker den etter hensikten?", Samfunnsøkonomen 5: 4-11

Data: Detailed data about car ownership including some usage measures per vehicle can be provided by the supervisor, in addition to data on tollroads and charging stations.

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN, ENE, BUS, FIE, INB

Supervisor: Morten Sæthre

Background:

This project aims to estimate a demand system for various commodity groups (food and non-alcoholic drinks, alcohol and tobacco, clothing, transport, etc) based on budget survey data collected by statistics Norway.  The objective is to establish precise estimates for the price elasticities. These elasticities will determine the efficiency loss of implied by the indirect tax system (value added taxes and excise taxes), and the distribution of these efficiency losses across the income distribution.   In this project, various specifications for the demand system can be tried out and tested against each other.  Next, efficiency losses can be computed.  This project is within the field of applied microeconomics.  It combines microeconomic theory (demand theory) with data analysis

Key references:

Banks J, R Blundell and A Lewbel (1996) “Tax reform and welfare measurement: do we need demand system estimation?” Economic Journal 106: 1227-1241.

Data:  Household budget surveys conducted by Statistics Norway (available through NSD). Price index statistics constructed by Statistics Norway.

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN (experience with STATA is required)

Supervisor: Fred Schroyen

To understand how prices are adjusted, and why, is very important, for both consumers, firm-owners and -managers, regulators and macro economists. The typical IO question; How does a firm set the price or quantity in relation to other market participants? Macro economists: Monetary policy has only a real effect if prices (and wages) are sticky (think of the IS-LM or AD-AS models). Price adjustment costs and their nature are central for industrial organization and the macro economy. What do we know empirically about the micro behaviour of firms? Do we see some patterns in firms’ price setting? Do we observe immediate responses to demand-, technology-, and cost-shocks?

Based on survey information from Statistics Norway about product prices in the manufacturing industry, merged with register data on firms’ revenues, costs, investments, and labour demand there are several topics for empirical master theses on pricing behaviour, either seen through the lenses of an IO scholar, or a macro economist.

Data: As the data include highly sensitive information, it is necessary to apply for access to the data.

Supervisor: Øivind Anti Nilsen

Background:

In markets characterized by subscription services, such as electricity, banking and telecommunications, we often find that consumers change providers or plans to a very low extent despite considerable price differences between seemingly similar (or even homogenous) products. There are many potential explanations for this phenomenon, e.g., lack of information, costs of switching, and strong preferences for particular providers. Understanding the sources of passive consumer behavior is important for both regulation, business planning, government policy and market design. We find clear signs of consumer passivity also in the Norwegian electricity retail market, and data sources available to this supervisor can allow a talented student to shed light on some of the potential channels.

Key references:

von der Fehr and Hansen (2010): "Electricity Retailing in Norway", The Energy Journal 31: 25-45 (Basic reference); Hortacsu et al (2015): "Power to Choose? An Analysis of Consumer Inertia in the Residential Electricity Market", NBER Working Paper No. 20988 (Advanced reference)

Data: Monthly data on number of subscriptions and sales (kWh) for the largest retailers within local areas will be provided by the supervisor, as well as weekly contract prices and monthly visitor statistics for the contract comparison website of the Competition Authority. Wholesale electricity prices and other useful market statistics can be gathered from Nordpool.

Suitable for profiles: ECO, ECN, ENE, BUS, FIE, INB

Supervisor: Morten Sæthre

Background:

The problem of adverse selection can alter the operation of markets in fundamental ways; for example, as in Akerlof's lemon market where used-car sellers have private information about the quality of cars, only low-quality cars will predominate in the market, because sellers would not be compensated for offering good-quality cars. Although the problem stems from asymmetric information, little attention has been paid to how sellers might supply information (or provide evidence) to mitigate asymmetric information problems. Intuitively, if they can, sellers who own good-quality cars are willing to provide hard evidence, in order to discriminate from lemon sellers. However, such a verification process is often costly. How this trade-off affects sellers' incentive to provide evidence? More generally, is the option of providing evidence useful in mitigating the problem of adverse selection?

Key references:

(1) Paul Milgrom (2008) "What the Seller won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets", Journal of Economic Perspectives.

(2) Eddie Dekel's slides for presidential address in EEA-ESEM 2016.

Suitable for profiles:  ECN, MBM, STR, ECO

Supervisor: Chang-Koo Chi

Background:

Consider a dynamic bargaining problem between a buyer and a seller in exhaustible-resource markets. The resource (e.g., oil) seller is better informed about its reserve than the buyer, and determines supply of the recourse strategically in that the seller wants to increase the buyer's dependence on the resource to strengthen her bargaining power. The buyer is also strategic; he has an option to develop an alternative resource (a backstop technology) to reduce his dependence on the resource, but there is a time-to-build delay for developing the technology. It would be interesting to see how strategic behaviors and asymmetric information affect the equilibrium price dynamics. The result may also suggest a policy implication for oil-producing countries. 

Key references:

For survey, refer to Gerard Gaudet (2007) "Natural Resource Economics under the Rule of Hotelling", Canadian Journal of Economics. For recent contributions, refer to Gerlagh and Liski (2013) "Strategic Resource Dependence", Journal of Economic Theory

Suitable for profiles:  ECN, ENE, STR, ECO

Supervisor: Chang-Koo Chi

Supervisor: Øystein Foros.

Supervisor: Øystein Foros.

Sammenligne f.eks. Norge og Finland som har ulik markedsstruktur. Mye deskriptiv empiri for å bedre forstå markedet og forskjellen mellom landene.

Supervisor: Øystein Foros.

Kulturminister Trine Skei Grande har nylig foreslått å utvide bokavtalen. Det vil gi en lengre fastprisperiode og høyere priser på opptil 65 prosent av bøkene. Den norske bokavtalen, som gir forleggerne rett til å sette en fast pris på nye bøker, er havnet i søkelyset til Efta-landenes overvåkningsorgan Esa. Nylig besvarte Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet (NFD), på vegne av den norske regjeringen, en rekke spørsmål fra Esa om forholdet mellom bokavtalen og EØS-avtalens eksplisitte forbud mot prissamarbeid i artikkel 53. Her kunne det være interessant å sammenligne med kommisjonens sak mot Amazon ift most-favored nation (MFN) klausuler.

Supervisor: Øystein Foros.

Med utgangspunkt i prosjektet Moving towards the market of one? Competition with personalized pricing and endogenous mismatch costs, jobbe med applikasjoner? Kan også knyttet opp mot AI.

Supervisor: Øystein Foros.

For at pengepolitikken skal ha en virkning, er en forutsetning at det er en viss grad av prisrigiditet hos aktørene i økonomien. Tidligere analyser viser stor variasjon i hyppigheten av produktprisendringer, både mellom bedrifter og mellom ulike næringer. I denne oppgaven skal vi spesielt se på konsentrasjonen og/eller markedsandelen til en bedrift, og hvordan dette påvirker prisendringsmønsteret. Er det slik at markedsandelen til en bedrift har betydning for prisendringsmønsteret? Dataene baseres på prisdata fra norske industribedrifter samlet sammen av SSB.

Supervisor: Øivind Anti Nilsen