

# WEIJIA WANG

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NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics

## EDUCATION

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<b>NHH Norwegian School of Economics</b> Ph.D. Research Scholar in Economics	08/2020 - present
<b>University of Zurich</b> Master of Arts in Business and Economics	02/2019 - 08/2020
<b>University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign</b> Bachelor of Science in Liberal Arts and Science: Mathematics Bachelor of Fine Arts in Industrial Design & Bachelor of Fine Arts in Crafts	08/2011 - 05/2015

## RESEARCH STAYS

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<b>University of Zurich</b> <i>Host: Prof. Björn Bartling</i>	09/2023 - 02/2024
<b>Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods</b> <i>Host: Prof. Mathias Sutter</i>	01/2022

## REFERENCES

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<b>Alexander Wright Cappelen</b> Professor of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, alexander.cappelen@nhh.no
<b>Erik Øiolf Sørensen</b> Professor of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, erik.sorensen@nhh.no
<b>Thomas de Haan</b> Associate Professor of Economics, University of Bergen, thomas.dehaan@uib.no
<b>Björn Bartling</b> Professor of Economics, University of Zurich, bjoern.bartling@econ.uzh.ch

## RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE

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<b>Research Data Manager</b> FAIR, NHH	04/2022 - 08/2022
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## TEACHING EXPERIENCES

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<b>Solving Economic and Social Problems with Big Data</b> <i>Teaching assistant, NHH</i>	2023
<b>Behavioral Business Strategy</b> <i>Teaching assistant, NHH</i>	2021, 2022
<b>Long-Term Macroeconomic Analysis</b> <i>Teaching assistant, NHH</i>	2021, 2022

## JOB MARKET PAPER

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### **Incentives vs. Fairness: Navigating Trade-offs in Managerial Decision Making** [Draft] (*single-authored*)

The structure of compensation schemes determines both the incentives workers face and the distribution of their income. A larger pay difference between high and low performers creates stronger incentives to produce, but also creates greater inequality that may be perceived as unfair. In an experiment, I show that most participants expect a winner-takes-all tournament scheme to drive higher output than an equal-pay scheme, but view it as less fair. Thus, when choosing one to pay a pair of workers, they encounter a trade-off between maximizing output and ensuring fairness. Using a between-subject design, I find that how they handle the trade-off depends on whether their own compensation is linked to worker output. Without personal stakes, most prefer the fairer equal-pay scheme, accepting a lower expected output. However, the influence of fairness concerns diminishes when they earn a proportional commission on worker output, leading most to favor the tournament scheme in anticipation of higher personal income. This paper suggests that individual fairness preferences play a significant role in managerial decision-making, sometimes outweighing considerations of both personal income and firm efficiency.

## WORKING PAPER

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### **Fairness Preferences, Inequality Acceptance and Default Effects** [Draft] (with *Justin Valasek* and *Pauline Vorjohann*)

An influential subset of the literature on distributional preferences studies how preferences condition on information about workers' characteristics, such as their relative productivity. In this study we confirm that there are default effects when such conditional fairness preferences are measured using the "inequality acceptance" method. Depending on the default, implemented inequality decreases by over 65% and cross-country differences are not observed. To organize the data, we develop a simple framework in which agents form a reference point based on a combination of their conditional distributional preferences and the default. We use this framework to illustrate that choice data from different defaults is needed to separately identify distributional preferences and default effects, and discuss best practices for measuring fairness preferences.

## WORK IN PROGRESS

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### **Fair Institutions** (with *Justin Valasek*)

The experimental literature on fairness preferences has established that individual perceptions of what earning distributions are fair depends greatly on context. In this paper, we study an important dimension of context that has been largely neglected: whether redistribution occurs through ex ante institutions or through ex post redistribution. We show that contrary to the hypothesis that individuals equalize expected earnings at the time of choice, we find no evidence that subjects are more likely to equalize ex post earnings relative to choosing equal institutions ex ante. Interestingly, our study also suggests that while Scandinavian subjects are more likely to equalize ex post earnings than US subjects, Scandinavian and American subjects look almost identical when they make choices over ex ante institutions.

## (Un)fair Income Experiences and Fairness Preferences

(with *Kelin Lu*)

Most of the fairness preferences studies compare people's preferences over inequalities generated by different sources that may be perceived as fair or unfair. However, inequality by itself influences people's subsequent behaviors. We use a novel experimental design that isolates fairness from inequality to identify its impact, in which subjects face identical situations – they made the same choice, exerted the same amount of effort, and earned the same with their counterparties. The only difference between treatments is whether their counterparties worked the same or less than them, representing cases of fair and unfair equality. Preliminary results show that while being exposed to unfair equality does not cause subjects to act more selfishly later, going through a fair experience makes them place higher emphasis on fairness in subsequent distributional choices.

## GRANTS

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Norges Banks fond til økonomisk forskning (NOK 20,000)	2023
NHH Centre for Ethics and Economics (NOK 31,200)	2022
Women in Economics Network (WomEN) (NOK 12,500)	2022
NHH Centre for Ethics and Economics (NOK 22,000)	2021

## CONFERENCES, PRESENTATIONS & WORKSHOPS

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<b>2024</b>	Emerging Researchers' Seminar (internal); Helsinki GSE Behavioral Economics Seminar (internal)
<b>2023</b>	Emerging Researchers' Seminar (internal); Bergen-Berlin Behavioral Economics Workshop; the Seventh International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS); Economic Science Association World Meeting; Behavioral Lab Meeting (internal); Matterhorn Symposium on Behavior, Institutions, and Cooperation
<b>2022</b>	Emerging Researchers' Seminar (internal), the Choice Lab Coffee Meeting (internal), the 14th BESLab Experimental Economics Summer School in Macroeconomics
<b>2021</b>	Emerging Researchers' Seminar (internal)

## SKILLS

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<b>Programming</b>	Python, JavaScript, HTML & CSS
<b>Software &amp; Tools</b>	STATA, oTree, Qualtrics, LaTeX, Microsoft Office
<b>Languages</b>	Mandarin Chinese (native), English (fluent), German (basic)